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Cantone: “Do You Hear What I Hear?”: Empirical Research on Earwitness Test

"DO YOU HEAR WHAT I HEAR?":
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON
EARWITNESS TESTIMONY
By Jason A. Cantonet
ABSTRACT
Despite recurring empiricalinterest in eyewitness research, legal scholars have
conducted far less research exploring the significance and limitations of
earwitness testimony. Nevertheless, earwitness expert testimony serves an importantpurpose, which dates back many centuries. This Article analyzes empirical studies regarding earwitness testimony and places them into a
recognized legal framework regarding admission of expert testimony. The result of this analysis demonstrates that, if courts believe that eyewitness testimony meets the restrictions on "junk science" employed by both Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Federal Rules of Evidence, then
the courts should also admit earwitness testimony under the same rationale.
This Article, however, recognizes the many methodological issues in the study
of earwitness testimony and addresses both the limitations in earwitness expert
testimony and the hurdles it must face to meet the evidential standards of
admissibility.
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"The human ear does not provide the best evidence in a murder case.
But its perceptions are evidence not to be despised or dismissed,
especially when the case is the murder of a president."'
Earwitness testimony dates back to the 1660s when the testimony of
one earwitness after the killing of King Charles I almost resulted in a
man's execution. Despite the earwitness's confidence, the true culprit
t J.D. with distinction, University of Nebraska College of Law; M.A., University
of Nebraska-Lincoln Department of Psychology; B.S. cum laude, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign. I give special thanks to Dr. Brian Bornstein, whose teachings
and research on eyewitness and earwitness testimony were the impetus for this Article and to Amy Ostdiek and Sias Scherger for reading a previous draft. I especially
thank my family and friends for their love and encouragement.
1. Harold Feldman, Fifty-one Witnesses: The Grassy Knoll, FAIR PLAY
(Sept.-Oct. 1996), http://www.acorn.net/jfkplace/09/fp.backissues/12th Issue/51 wits.
html (stating how many earwitnesses reported that the bullet that killed President
Kennedy came not from the book depository, but from the grassy knoll).
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confessed, saving the man's life and reminding decision makers ever
since of the inaccuracies of earwitness testimony.2 Yet the birth of
earwitness empirical analysis did not come until 1933 when Charles
Lindbergh testified that he recognized the voice of the man who
kidnapped his child and convinced the jury, despite the short duration
of the voice sample, questionable fairness of the identification, and
the misperception that Lindbergh's confidence in his identification
correlated with his accuracy.' Research soon followed to determine
whether these factors impact the validity of earwitness testimony.
Put simply, an earwitness hears the voice of a perpetrator, stores
that voice into memory, and then retrieves the stored vocal
description when identifying the speaker in a voice line-up or while
testifying.' Earwitnesses play an important role in cases that only
involve the defendant's voice, such as cases of telemarketing fraud
and other schemes especially noted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.' In charity schemes, for example, a caller might exploit
a person's desire to donate money to unemployed persons hit hard by
the recession by taking down the donor's credit card number or
providing a post office box for him to send a check or cash. If it is
fraud rather than an actual charity, the victim can only identify the
fraudulent telemarketer through his voice, especially if the phone
number is blocked.
But how accurate is vocal identification of a suspect? Many courts
do not allow expert testimony on how vocal misidentifications occur,
even though cases based upon eye witness cases in recent years have
faced increased scrutiny. Would expert testimony on the limitations
of earwitness testimony be based on scientifically sound research and
help the trier of fact (judge or jury) make an effective decision
regarding the validity of earwitness identifications?6
This Article addresses the admission of earwitness expert testimony
and will find that courts should allow this testimony, so jurors can
receive a more complete picture of factors that could influence
identifications. Part I will investigate empirical research on earwitness
testimony to create a necessary background for legal analysis. Part II
will explain the legal standards of admissibility and analyze whether
earwitness expert testimony would meet these standards. Part III will
2. Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M. Tiersma, Hearing Voices: Speaker
Identification in Court, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 373, 393-94 (2003).
3. State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809, 825 (N.J. 1935).
4. A. Daniel Yarmey, The Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness
Memory, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE
101, 101 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Psychology of Speaker
Identification and Earwitness Memory].
5. Common Fraud Schemes, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/fraud
schemes.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2010).
6. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Sanes, 57 F.3d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1995).
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then discuss misguided alternatives some courts have utilized to
exclude expert testimony and offer a conclusion.
I.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Despite an abundance of research on eyewitness testimony, empirical research on earwitness testimony pales in comparison. For example, a search within LexisNexis law reviews and journals for
"earwitness" found only 22 articles, with only two articles significantly
contributing to the legal literature, and only one of those articles in a
traditional law review or legal journal.7
Starting a new program of empirical earwitness research would not
require researchers to start from nothing. Instead, earwitness research can expand from an extensive body of research regarding eyewitness testimony. Earwitness research should investigate how factors
relevant to eyewitnesses (i.e. familiarity, disguise, exposure time, witness confidence) affect earwitness testimony accuracy, as well as factors more relevant to earwitnesses, such as the effect of phones on
recognition abilities. An empirical research program which expands
from eyewitness testimony research should be admissible in courts
and help assure that the trier of fact is aware of the limitations of
earwitness testimony. The following section proceeds through empirical research on each factor, detailing previous methodological approaches and how earwitness testimony research can benefit from past
research.
A.

Speaker Familiarityand Disguise

If your best friend sneaks up behind you, puts her hands over your
eyes and says, "guess who," your identification of the person might
stem not only from the voice but also familiarity with the person. In
1995, A. Daniel Yarmey explored this relationship between identification of familiar and unfamiliar voices. 8 Participants identified high familiar (immediate family member), moderate familiar (friend) and
low familiar (acquaintance) people in their lives.' Experimenters then
obtained those speakers and asked them to speak a set passage for the
participant. Results showed that both high familiar and moderate familiar voices were more readily identified than unfamiliar voices."o In
addition, participants falsely identified 45 percent of the unfamiliar
7. LEXIsNEXIs, http://www.lexisnexis.com/research (follow "Law Reviews &
Journals" hyperlink; then search by source "US Law Reviews and Journals, Combined" for "earwitness") (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). Both articles are discussed
herein.
8. See Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness Memory, supra note
4, at 117.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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voices as a familiar person." While these results confirmed past findings regarding the role of familiarity on speaker identification,12 the
research presents some concerns. When participants are asked to provide a list of highly familiar and moderately familiar voices and then,
later, asked to identify voices, they very well could be focused upon
the self-selected list they presented to the researchers. This could result in a heavy bias toward naming someone on their list in an ambiguous situation.
Although people are better at recognizing familiar voices, familiarity does not guarantee correct identification. What if a police officer
hears a voice over the phone and then three years later, makes his
identification and claims he recognized the voice? Should this be admissible? In U.S. v Knox (1998), the judge allowed the earwitness evidence,1 4 but the trier of fact should be aware of the many limitations
of such testimony.
One great limitation in recognizing a familiar voice is if the person
uses a vocal disguise. Researchers at Wayne State University performed a detailed analysis of different speak signals to determine
whether listeners can identify disguised voices. They found that pitch
and other vocal cues "are only modestly effective for identifying disguised voices."" Additionally, the researchers noted that there is a
lack of published research on the relationship between acoustic cues
and identifying disguised voices.
A criminal seeking to disguise his voice over the phone in a
telemarketing case or in person, accompanied by a physical disguise as
well, does not need advanced technology. Research shows that the
easiest way to effectively disguise a voice is also one of the simplest:
whispering. Much research has shown that whispering makes identification significantly more difficult, regardless of amount of exposure.17
Whispering conceals the most salient characteristics used for identification: pitch, inflection and intonation, and leads to a high chance of
false identification. However, lay persons do not fully comprehend
11. Id.
12. Phil Rose & Sally Duncan, Naive Auditory Identificationand Discriminationof
Similar Voices by FamiliarListeners, 2 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 1, 1-17 (1995).
13. See Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness Memory, supra note
4.
14. United States v. Knox, No. 97-5492, 1998 WL 777986, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Oct. 22,
1998).
15. Jean Andruski et al., Identifying Disguised Voices through Speakers' Vocal
Pitches and Formants,153rd ASA Meeting, Salt Lake City, Utah (June 7, 2007), http://
www.acoustics.org/press/153rd/andruski.html.
16. Id.
17. Tara L. Orchard & A. Daniel Yarmey, The Effects of Whispers, Voice-Sample
Duration, and Voice Distinctiveness on Criminal Speaker Identification, 9 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 249, 250 (1995).
18. When the passage was whispered, highly familiar voices were identified correctly 77% of the time (versus 89% in a normal tone), moderately familiar voices 35%
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the difficulties behind identifying a whispered voice. In a research
study, listeners predicted that people would be 91 percent accurate in
identifying whisperings from highly familiar voices and 74 percent accurate for unfamiliar voices. This differed significantly from the
study's actual findings of 77 percent and 20 percent correct identification, respectively. 19 Differences such as these, between common perceptions about earwitness testimony and empirical results about such
identifications, further exhibit how expert testimony can aid the trier
of fact. Criminals can also simply disguise their voices with a tone or
pitch change; both impair recognition and result in an increased number of false identifications.2 0 Just as whispering can be done easily,
disguising a voice to a point where recognition is severely hampered
also requires minimal effort. Brazilian kidnappers once placed pencils
in their mouths to disguise their voices and prevent identification.'
Furthermore, people's voices change with age; if a long time passes
between hearing the voice and identifying the voice, age effects can
naturally change the suspect's voice. This is yet another reason why a
judge should understand limitations of earwitness testimony before allowing an earwitness to testify about a voice he heard years before,
such as in United States v. Knox, described supra.22 The United States
v. Knox case is certainly not the only case where a great amount of
time separated hearing the voice and identifying it.
In United States v. DiMuro, which focused on an illegal gambling
business and the use of a wiretap, an agent identified the defendant's
voice four years after he claimed he first heard the voice. 2 3 The appellants complained that the "considerable lapse of time" between the
wiretapped interceptions and the identifications made the voice identifications at trial "unreliable and improper." 24 The court found that
the four-year gap did not affect the validity of the identification because the agent had spoken to the defendant twice and identified the
defendant's voice from the original tapes.2 5 While the Federal Rules
were not in effect at the time of the trial, the judge noted that Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE) 901(b)(5) provided that '[i]dentification of a
voice, whether heard firsthand or through ... electronic ... recording,
(versus 75%), voices with low familiarity 22% (versus 66%), and unfamiliar voices
were acknowledged as such 20% (versus 61%). A. Daniel Yarmey et al., Commonsense Beliefs and the Identification of Familiar Voices, 15 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 283, 285, 294 (2001).
19. Id. at 294.
20. Frank Schlichting & Kirk P. H. Sullivan, The Imitated Voice-A Problem for
Voice Line-Ups?, 4 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 148, 149 (1997).
21. Ricardo Molina de Figueiredo & Helena de Souza Britto, A Report on the
Acoustic Effects of One Type of Disguise, 3 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 168 (1996).
22. United States v. Knox, No. 97-5492, 1998 WL 777986, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Oct. 22,
1998).
23. United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 513 (1st Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 513-14.
25. Id.
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by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker is sufficient for the admissibility of voice identification evidence." 2 6 The court permitted the
identification and allowed the jury to decide the accuracy. 27 Yet, it is
difficult to assume that an identification made one day later is as reliable as one made ten years later. Under FRE 901, the court can admit
the identification with "sufficient reliability," which is often any identification, regardless of suggestive procedures, because FRE 901
presumes all identifications are accurate. 2 8 Using the same logic, one
would presume all eyewitness testimony is accurate, especially if the
identifier claims to have seen the defendant. 29 However, this presumption is clearly false, as the media continually reports on death
row inmates exonerated after guilty verdicts based at least in part on
misidentifications. The Innocence Project finds that eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions, a factor in
75 percent of post-conviction DNA exoneration cases.3 0 Thus, while
the Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 901 state, ". . . aural voice

identification is not a subject of expert testimony,"31 one should still
act with caution before relying on earwitness testimony exclusively
and consider the many factors which could impact the validity of such
an identification.
B.

Emotion and Tone

Few studies have explored how emotions and stress can impact
earwitness memory.3 2 For a better identification, the vocal line-up
should match the emotion and tone of the suspect at the time of the
crime. For example, if a suspect yelled, "Give me your money!", providing a vocal line-up of men saying those words in normal conversational tone will lead to significantly poorer identification accuracy.
It would be two different voices being considered as one. If admissible to the court, an expert could explain discrepancies in emotion and
tone and offer the limitations of earwitness testimony based upon
these emotional factors and also the familiarity and disguise concerns
mentioned supra.
26. Id. at 513.
27. United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).
28. FED. R. EvID. 901(a); People v. Griffin, 592 N.E.2d 930, 934 (Ill. 1992).
29. See supra Part I. In future research, this author intends to investigate how
juries analyze this identification of voices on tape, and how perception's of the
speaker's race (i.e. black, white, Latino) impacts the identification and perception of
severity of the crime.
30. The Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://

www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php.
31. FED R. EVID. 901 advisory committee's note subdiv. (b), ex. 5.
32. Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness Memory, supra note 4, at

114.
33. See Howard Saslove & A. Daniel Yarmey, Long-Term Auditory Memory:
Speaker Identification, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 111, 111-12 (1980).
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Earwitness experts can also offer insight when there is a tape of the
suspect's voice to be compared with a vocal line-up including the defendant. Experts can play more than one role here, either commenting on an earwitness's identification or making their own
identification. Research found that experts (those trained in phonetics) were less likely to misidentify voices because of emotional factors,
and more likely to make accurate identifications than those with no
background or moderate training.34 Additional studies confirm that
experts are more reliable at making auditory identifications." Experts appear less misguided by emotions and tone of the speaker and
might also be more accurate because victims of more violent crimes,
where the perpetrator gave only vocal cues, might also be biased from
the stress of the situation. Thus, whether to inform jurors about factors impacting identification accuracy or to provide their own identification, earwitness experts have much to offer the judicial system.
C.

Amount of Exposure

Often, earwitnesses only have a brief exposure to the voice and no
corresponding exposure to facial features or other physical identifiers.
Research has supported common sense notions that longer exposure
to the criminal's voice leads to greater accuracy in identifications. 6
However, that does not mean longer exposure leads to guaranteed
correct identifications. In fact, some researchers believe this body of
literature is inconclusive and state that there is no set correlation between the voice-sample duration and the chance of mistaken
identification."
When someone is asked to make an identification, people are disposed to make one-even if they are not necessarily confident in their
choice. This leads to false alarms, even if people listen to the criminal
talk at length. But what if the telemarketing fraud is based not on one
phone call, but two or three shorter calls? Research has found that
two, but not three, distributed calls might lead to significantly better
3
A third expoidentifications than only one exposure to the voice?.
sure might be redundant and not offer additional information.3 9 Ad34. Harry Hollien & Reva Schwartz, Aural-Perceptual Speaker Identification:
Problems with Noncontemporary Samples, 7 FORENSIc LINGUSITIcs 199, 206-07
(2000).
35. See Olaf Kumoster et. al., The CorrelationBetween Auditory Speech Sensitivity
and Speaker Recognition Ability, 5 FORENSIC LINGUISTIcs 22 (1998) (indicating that
experts performed identifications with more success).
36. See Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness Memory, supra note
4.
37. Psychology of Speaker Identificationand Earwitness Memory, supra note 4, at
120; see Orchard & Yarmey, supra note 12, at 258-59.
38. See Erica E. Proctor & A. Daniel Yarmey, The Effect of Distributed Learning
on the Identification of Normal-Tone and Whispered Voices, 13(1) THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF THINKING & PROBLEM SOLVING 17 (2003).
39. Id.
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ditionally, the researchers found that identification accuracy depended
upon the tone of the voice and length of the voice sample (18 seconds
or 6 minutes)."0
In 1937, Frances McGehee found that, regardless of how long the
criminal is heard, earwitness identifications rapidly deteriorate over a
two-week period and then remain relatively stable." More recent research has found that voice identification remains at fifty percent after
one week, but falls dramatically to nine percent accuracy after three
weeks."2 These studies should encourage caution in judges and juries
willing to accept identifications made as long as three years" 3 or four
years after the event," especially when an earwitness's memory could
deteriorate by half as little as seven days later. But what if the special
agent identifying a voice four years later states to the court that he is
entirely confident in his identification?
D.

Witness Confidence

The Supreme Court stated, in Neil v. Biggers, that an eyewitness's
certainty should be examined when assessing accuracy for the identification."5 This corresponds with the commonly held belief that a more
confident witness is also a more accurate one."6 However, this belief
is not supported in empirical research. In one meta-analysis, only
twenty-one of forty studies found a relationship between eyewitness
confidence and accuracy."7 A more recent review of the literature
showed a small to moderate positive relationship between eyewitness
confidence and accuracy.48 Earwitness studies have found similar results-that there is not a reliable correlation between an earwitness's
confidence and the accuracy of his identification. 9 Yet jurors still rely
40. Id.
41. Frances McGehee, The Reliability of the Identification of the Human Voice, 17
J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 249, 261-62, 268 (1937).
42. Brian R. Clifford, Memory for Voices: The Feasibility and Quality of Earwitness Evidence, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 189, 200 (1983).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Knox, No. 97-5492, 1998 WL 777986 (6th Cir. Oct.
22, 1998).
44. United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 513 (1st Cir. 1976).
45. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
46. See Gary L. Wells et al., The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its
Implicationsfor Triers of Fact, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 688 (1981).
47. See Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness Memory, supra note
4; BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 95 (1995).
48. Id. at 94-95; Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, Eyewitness Confidence

and the Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Memory for People, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 377, 413 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007).
49. Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Relevance of Voice Identification Research to
Criteriafor Evaluating Reliability of an Identification, 123 J. PSYCHOL. 109, 115 (1989).
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on an earwitness's confidence in their own judgments of accuracy."o If
a judge admits tape recorded evidence under FRE 901 and allows the
jury to decide if the voice on the tape is indeed the defendant's, the
earwitness's confidence might play an exaggerated role in the jury's
decision. An expert should be able to convey relevant empirical research regarding witness confidence not to bias the jury in each direction but to provide caution before relying on a factor research
continually questions. These are not always easy empirical studies to
summarize, and there are many factors which can be relevant and confuse a juror as much as they are meant to aid the trier of fact, but if
jurors rely too heavily on an earwitness's confidence and are not better informed of these factors, misidentifications can lead to innocent
people found guilty.
Telephone conversations also involve their own issues. Research
exploring identification of voices over the telephone has found that inperson and telephone voices have different frequencies, which can impact the components of tone and pitch for earwitness memory.5 ' Due
to these divergent frequencies, important encoding dimensions might
not be heard and earwitness memory of the voice could be biased by
the means in which the earwitness hears the voice. Different speakers
might also sound the same when distortions due to telephone communications (i.e. losing reception) are taken into account. 52 Telephone
conversations can also involve other aural cues which could improve
identification (either by the earwitness or by those listening to a recording later). Recent films include countless examples of police
hearing noises in the background such as the elevated "El" trains in
Chicago or the sound of a boat going to sea and hearing these oral
stimuli can help track where the call is made, although not necessarily
who made the call. Yet, research finds that background noise and
other distractions such as sirens or background voices actually hurt
recognition accuracy, as they can reduce the listener's focus on the
speaker.5 3
Just as earwitness identification is better when the vocal line-up is
congruent to the emotion and tone of the alleged criminal at the time
of the crime, vocal line-ups stemming from telephone conversations
should also be congruent. Research found that when the earwitness
first heard the person through a tape recorder, identification was more
50. Cf Amy L. Bradfield & Gary L. Wells, The Perceived Validity of Eyewitness
Identification Testimony: A Test of the Five Biggers Criteria, 24 LAW & Hum. BEHAV.
581 (2000) (although this study focuses upon eyewitness testimony, the research on
earwitness testimony would hypothesize similar results; future research should confirm this hypothesis).
51. Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness Memory, supra note 4, at
122-23.
52. The Effects of Whispers, Voice-Sample Duration, and Voice Distinctiveness on
CriminalSpeaker Identification, supra note 17.
53. PHILIP ROSE, FORENSIC SPEAKER IDENTIFICATION (2002).
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successful when based upon a vocal line-up of tape recorded rather
than in-person voices. 54 Overall, research finds that congruency is important, and this is a relevant factor for the jury to consider.
II.

THE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY

To allow any of the evidence illustrated in Part I, the court must
determine that the evidence is admissible based upon set legal criteria." Jurors should rely on the greatest amount of admissible information possible when making a decision. But some judges might
believe that earwitness testimony experts might not be "beyond the
ken of the juror"" and would provide unnecessary and sometimes unreliable testimony. The court attempted to balance these concerns in
the 1923 ruling of Frye v. United States."

In Frye, the court addressed

the admissibility of the precursor to the modern and still contested
polygraph test." The court held that the test "has not yet gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments
thus far made." 9 The court then established that this standing and
scientific recognition requires general acceptance in the relevant
field.60 This came to be known as the Frye general acceptance test.
Although Frye provided guidance on expert testimony, it also created
confusion. Frye did not provide judges with guidance on how to determine general acceptance and brought more subjectivity into the courtroom. In addition, a general acceptance standard denies the utility of
new methods, as it often takes a long time for a new method to become generally accepted by the academic community as a whole.
Thus, the judge could exclude relevant and probative evidence because it was too new and not yet generally embraced by the relevant
academic community.
Seeking to address these concerns, the framers of the Federal Rules
of Evidence codified a specific rule regarding expert testimony. FRE
702 states that the testimony must help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or determine a fact in issue and be based upon sound
methodology.6' This rule does not mimic the Frye general acceptance
standard. Thus, although for seventy years expert testimony was inad54. H. A. Rathborn et al., Voice Recognition Over the Telephone, 9 J. POLICE ScI.
& ADMIN. 280, 283-84 (1981).
55. Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert's
Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 1085, 1085 (2006).
56. FED R. EvID. 702.
57. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by
statute, Fed. R. Evid. 702.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1014.
60. Id.
61. FED. R. EvID. 702.
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missible unless the principles gained general acceptance, courts now
were unsure whether to apply Frye or FRE 702.62 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit found Frye "overly-vague, and to require a type of 'nose-counting' that is inconsistent with sound judicial
policy" and developed a new test very similar to the approach the U.S.
Supreme Court would take eight years later.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that their mother's use of a drug led to birth defects.' In order
to prove their claim, the plaintiffs sought to introduce new expert scientific testimony that the drug caused defects in laboratory tests.
However, because of the tests' newness, the district court found that
the empiricism did not meet the Frye general acceptance standard and
denied the expert. The court then granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment because the plaintiffs could not otherwise prove
the causal link.65 The appellate court affirmed. 66 The Supreme Court
then found that FRE 702 superseded Frye, and that a court basing
expert testimony under the Frye general acceptance test with no deference to the FRE would be in error. The Court also looked to the
intent of the FRE drafters. While the FRE sought to "relax the traditional barriers to opinion testimony," the Frye test would keep the
court guarded. 67 The Court in Daubert then created a two-prong test
for admissibility. To admit the evidence, the judge must find (1) the
testimony reliable, as explained by Daubert and (2) be able to assist
the trier of fact, as explained by FRE 702.68 Returning to the main
Daubert criteria, for earwitness testimony evidence to be admissible,
the empirical point should be testable and must be falsifiable through
examination. In addition, factors such as publication and peer review,
as well as known or potential error rate, help to secure that the research is methodologically sound.6 9 The Court also retained the Frye
"general acceptance" language, although placed it as one of many factors rather than the sole requirement as in Frye."o In 2000, experts
amended FRE 702 to read:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
62. Welch, supra note 42, at 1087.
63. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993); Thomas L.
Cooper, Expert Witness Testimony - Frye Revealed - The Impact of Trach-Fellin II,
75 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 10, 11 (2004) (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238
(3d Cir. 1985)).
64. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
65. Id. at 583-84.
66. Id. at 584-85.
67. Id. at 588-89.
68. Id. at 592-94.
69. Id. at 592-95.
70. Id. at 594. Later, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999),
the Court expanded Daubert's definition of "scientific knowledge" to engineers and
those in technical or mechanical fields.
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issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Thus, the judge must determine the reliability of not only the testimony, but also the methodology behind the empirical analyses. This
can be a difficult task without a strong background in research methods and could lead to unintentional errors. Still, judges have a large
breadth of case law on the Daubert criteria and Federal Rules to assure that the testimony meets both tests.7 2
A.

Examining the Daubert Criteria

Before determining if earwitness empirical research is admissible in
courts, it is important to assess whether it meets the Daubert criteria.
While an eyewitness case, United States v. Lester is instructive for
earwitness analysis. In U.S. v. Lester, the court went through an intensive analysis to determine if eyewitness expert Dr. Brian Cutler could
testify in the case about six different factors impacting eyewitness
identification."Among these factors are exposure time, witness stress/
emotional state, retention retrieval, and the relationship between witness confidence and accuracy, all discussed supra in earwitness
research.7 4
The court found that the trial court must first assess the significance
of the identification in the prosecution's case. Expert evidence will be
more probative if the case relies more exclusively on the identification. Second, the trial court must assure that the factors are relevant
and beyond the common knowledge of the average juror, as required
by FRE 702. Third, the court must find that the probative value of the
evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, as required by FRE 403. All are also relevant for an earwitness inquiry.
Regarding the four of six factors mentioned in U.S. v. Lester and in
this Article supra, the court found that Dr. Cutler could testify regarding the witness's stress and emotional state and the correlation (or
lack thereof) between confidence and accuracy.
71.

FED.

R. EvID. 702.

72. Some jurisdictions still rely on Frye, which will be assessed during discussion of
the Daubert criteria.
73. United States v. Lester, 254 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2003) (mem. op.).
74. Id.

75. Id. The court also found that Dr. Cutler could testify regarding the weapon
focus, where research has found that an eyewitness to a crime that features a deadly
weapon will focus upon that weapon, reducing the accuracy of the identification. For a
meta-analysis reviewing weapon focus effect, and finding a significant difference between identifications with and without a weapon, see Nancy M. Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAw & Hum.
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Expanding from this decision, experts seeking to introduce earwitness testimony into courts should make clear that such testimony is
probative (perhaps if there is a discrepancy in earwitness identifications or if the defendant's guilt or innocence will depend upon the
identification) and should explain why each empirical effect goes beyond the ken of the jury.7 6 Finally, the expert should either quantify
the relevance of the research and do so with "sufficient clarity" or
provide a "benchmark sufficient to allow [jurors] to make a reasoned
assessment."" It is not the expert's job to make the jury's final decision; experts must work to reduce confusion, increase understanding
of empirical findings, and allow jurors to make intelligent decisions.
Judges do not often wade through complicated methodological
questions regarding the reliability of the utilized research methods.
For example, in U.S. v. Libby, a case involving expert testimony, the
government did not contest that empirical research would meet the
scientific rigor requirements elucidated in Daubert." Instead, the case
focused upon the second tier of the argument, arguing that expert testimony does not meet the requirements under FRE 702.71 As shown
through the Lewis case, eyewitness evidence on similar factors as
those necessary for earwitness cases is admissible; accordingly, earwitness evidence should be admissible under a Daubert, FRE 702, and
FRE 403 multi-part inquiry. But legal actors still need to consider the
Daubertempirical factors to assure that the research used is the best
possible evidence, especially when guilt or innocence is on the line.
Earwitness studies should be in peer-reviewed journals, preferably
ones highly respected in the relevant legal, psycholegal, or psychological communities. While peer reviewed journals will generally prevent
the publication of results based upon methodologically suspect designs, it is still important to assess the reliability and falsifiability of the
results, as required by Daubert.so Expanding from more common eyewitness cases, judges should find that earwitness research follows recognized scientific standards, meets requirements of general
acceptance, and should be admissible under Daubertand the relevant
Federal Rules of Evidence.
Courts relying on Frye must focus on general acceptance. Judges
generally have very little knowledge of eyewitness research and are
not a good gauge of what is generally accepted in the academic com76. The judge found that the testimony had probative value, but found that some
of the factors were intuitive and within expected common sense (Lester, 254 F. Supp.
2d 602).
77. Id.
78. United States v. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d 3, 8 (D.D.C. 2006) (mem. op.).
79. See id. at 9; FED. R. EVID. 702.
80. A. Daniel Yarmey, The Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness
Memory, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE
101, 101 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Psychology of Speaker
Identification and Earwitness Memory].
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munity.m High caliber psychology journals are rarely read by those in
the legal community and a stronger effort is needed for psychology
researchers to publish their results in law reviews and legal periodicals
more commonly read by judges. Although no research has explicitly
asked judges of their earwitness knowledge, one might assume even
less knowledge of earwitness research and how individual factors can
impact the accuracy of earwitness testimony.
Even though the government conceded the methodological Daubert
tier in United States v. Libby, a footnote explained that eyewitness
research meets general acceptance standards.8 2 The court also acknowledged that "there can be little doubt" the research is well-established and generally accepted in the scientific community. Because
much of the research for earwitness testimony matches the methodologies and results of eyewitness testimony, judges should find general
acceptance for earwitness research as well. Although earwitness testimony may be discussed in fewer publications, it has been studied the
last seventy years with consistent results and the results often mimic
the same biasing factors in accepted eyewitness testimony. Thus,
earwitness should satisfy both the Daubert and Frye standards and
proceed to the Federal Rules analysis.
B.

Looking to the Federal Rules

Even if earwitness research meets the Daubert criteria, the testimony must also meet FRE 702. While much of this analysis is explained supra regarding U.S. v. Lewis, it is important to re-iterate that
expert testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand or determine the facts at issue.8 4 Judges are cautious to intrude upon the role
of the jury and do not wish to admit evidence that might not assist
them or assist them to determine the ultimate inquiry, which is not
legally permissible. While FRE 702 cautions judges to limit expert
witnesses that would intrude on the providence of the jury, concern
with earwitness expert testimony is misguided.
First, earwitness testimony would assist the trier of fact in analyzing
the accuracy of the earwitness identification and in making their decision. FRE 702 limits testimony that does not offer the jury new information and remains within the ken of the jury, but research finds that
factors impacting earwitness identification are not always known by
the jury. For example, jurors often incorrectly assume that a witness's
81. Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, What US Judges Know and Believe About
Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427 passim (2004).
82. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 8 & n.6 (citing Robertson v. McCloskey, 676 F. Supp.
351, 355 (D.D.C. 1988)).
83. Id. at 8 n.6 (listing four peer-reviewed studies this assumption is based upon).
84. FED. R. EvID. 702.

85. See United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1999).
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confidence corresponds with his accuracy.8 In addition, a substantial
number of potential jurors have misconceptions about what can bias
identifications. The average juror (or average judge, for that matter)
does not fully understand what affects eyewitness or earwitness
reliability.
Research studies do not always involve the same facts as the
presented case, which can lead judges to believe that empirical results
are irrelevant." Furthermore, college students asked to look at
videos or pictures and then identify a suspect will not likely have the
same emotional investment as an actual victim seeking to find who
took advantage of him. Still, those assessing the validity of empirical
results should also consider when research findings are replicated
broadly across different contexts and different types of participants
before determining if it is irrelevant because it does not involve the
specific facts of the case.
Furthermore, empirical research on earwitness testimony might offer more ecological validity than eyewitness testimony research, as
fewer external stimuli could impact judgments. For example, an eyewitness in a bank robbery would be emotionally impacted by being
part of a bank robbery, resulting in many different variables which
would need to be assessed in a laboratory study. While not perfect, an
earwitness might be sitting in his or her own home, with the criminal
speaking over the phone. This situation is easier to replicate in a laboratory. 89 Earwitness research often involves some of the same cognitive and psychological factors as eyewitness testimony, and similar
legal analyses should apply. Thus, while the judicial concern of ecological validity is a valid concern, expert testimony should be permissible so the trier of fact can hear about factors relevant to earwitness
identification. All of this detailed, empirical knowledge would indeed
assist the juror to understand the accuracy of the identification and
meet the standard of FRE 702.
Second, even if a judge finds that earwitness expert testimony is not
beyond the ken of the jury and can assist the trier of fact,90 the judge
might exclude the testimony if it goes directly to the ultimate issue in
the case-that the voice heard is the defendant's. FRE 704(a) addresses this very issue. FRE 704(a) states, in part: "testimony in the
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact." 9 1 Psychological expert testimony can expand jurors' knowl86. See supra Part I.D; see also Bradfield & Wells, supra note 37.
87. Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understandingof
Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177 passim (2006).
88. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 10-11.
89. The Author intends to explore these judicial concerns in upcoming research
projects.
90. FED. R. EVID. 702.
91. FED. R. EvID. 704(a).
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edge without impacting the ultimate inquiry beyond what is legally
permissible.9 2 In a robbery trial with mock jurors, Dr. Cutler and colleagues found that the witnesses provided with knowledge about influencing factors such as the confidence-accuracy correlation were less
likely to rely on the witness's reported confidence when determining
the accuracy of the identification.9 3 The study did not, however, find a
significant relationship between the expert testimony and the final
verdict. Some critics might argue that this shows expert witnesses are
not helpful and are solely a hindrance. However, keen analysis would
show that this study proves experts are doing their job of informing
the jury of empirical issues that could impact identification without
violating the Federal Rules and deciding the ultimate issue in the case.
It is still the jury's ultimate decision.
Even if the judge finds the evidence meets the requirements of
Daubert and FRE 702, the judge could still prevent the evidence
under FRE 403, which allows a judge to exclude evidence if its "probative value is substantially outweighed" by dangers such as unfair
prejudice, confusion, undue delay or waste of time." To avoid unfair
prejudice, earwitness experts should speak directly to the research and
not offer opinions such as "Mr. Smith is not an accurate witness." In
addition, while some judges might wish to exclude testimony under
FRE 403 as a waste of time because it is solely confusing and not at all
helpful, much research has disproved this assumption. Arguments
that expert opinions hold no probative value and only offer what jurors already know are faulty. As long as the expert provides general
empirical knowledge that might lend assistance to the jury making the
ultimate inquiry, the earwitness expert testimony should be
admissible.
The suggestion for earwitness expert testimony is not revolutionary.
Some courts find that earwitness experts parallel experts who point
out visual similarities between a defendant's appearance and a surveillance photo. Courts have found it reversible error to not permit that
type of expert. In United States v. Drones, the defendant was convicted, but new counsel brought in a voice identification expert to
show that the voice of the criminal was not the defendant's." This led
to a reversal of the conviction and the defendant filing a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel. 9 6 While this case by no means created a mandate for earwitness expert testimony, it sheds light on the
importance of a safeguard to prevent erroneous earwitness identifica92. Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist,and the Jury, 13
& Hum. BEHAV. 311 passim (1989).
93. Id.
94. FED. R. EVID. 403.

LAw

95. United States v. Drones, 218 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000); see Solan & Tiersma, supra note 2, at 415.
96. Id.
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tions. Overall, earwitness expert testimony should meet the Daubert
criteria, assist the trier of fact under FRE 702 and not overstep the
legal limits; thus, courts should find earwitness expert testimony
admissible.
III. MISGUIDED ALTERNATIVES
Despite the assistance expert earwitness testimony can provide,
judges often believe that cross-examination and jury instructions offer
a significant safeguard that does not warrant additional aid such as
expert testimony.
One of the first recognized cases involving expert testimony found
that cross-examination adequately explores credibility issues and that
expert testimony can determine the reliability of identifications and
that empirical knowledge is not beyond the ken of the average juror.9 7
Courts have determined that jurors listening to cross-examination can
determine the reliability of identifications and that empirical knowledge is not beyond the ken of the average juror.9 8
The research in Part I showed that jurors often enter trial with common misperceptions about earwitness testimony and could benefit
from empiricism. The Court in U.S. v. Knox held that the defense
attorney should not have the entire burden of proving the identification false. 99 Cross-examination cannot be very effective if the attorney doing the cross-examination of the earwitness is ignorant of the
influential factors. This lack of insight could cause attorneys to select
poorly constructed studies, as attorneys will not often know the best
methodologies or error rates, which are important factors under the
Daubert standard. In addition, attorneys and judges often mischaracterize what is not beyond the ken of the jury and might erroneously believe earwitness evidence is unnecessary and would fail the
FRE 702 requirement. Earwitness expert testimony will not only
teach the jury about impacting factors but also provide the most relevant research to the court.
An additional problem with the reliance on cross-examination is the
lack of a neutral party. Jurors might not know all the relevant empirical evidence regarding earwitness identification, but it is well within
their ken to know each attorney is fighting zealously for his client. If a
defense attorney utilizes scientific evidence to discredit the earwitness,
juries will rightfully ponder: Is this to make me aware of the science or
just to trick me into a not-guilty verdict? The defense attorney may

place greater importance on convincing the jurors of the defendant's
innocence than on educating jurors about the utility of empirical evi97. Criglow v. State, 36 S.W.2d 400 (Ark. 1931).
98. United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
99. United States v. Knox, No. 97-5492, 1998 WL 777986, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Oct. 22,
1998) (where a special agent provided earwitness testimony regarding having heard
the defendant's voice three years before).
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dence. Thus, even if attorneys do attempt to inform jurors of inaccuracies in testimony, cross-examination should not supersede the
importance of expert testimony.
Some legal minds believe that even when cross-examination is not
effective, jury instructions can ensure accurate evaluation. Eyewitness
cases such as United States v. Hicks have held that comprehensive jury
instructions are more than adequate to inform jurors of everything
they need to know.' 00 However, instructions often contain statements
that are inconsistent with the research, such as asking jurors to focus
upon the witness's confidence. This could potentially bias jurors even
further by re-enforcing inaccurate previously held beliefs about
earwitness testimony.
Even if jury instructions were perfectly written and agreed upon by
psychologists, to accurately portray cognitive biases and teach jurors
about factors beyond their ken, jury instructions are rarely effective to
solely combat previously held beliefs. Michael Hoffheimer sought to
examine the role of jury instructions on understanding eyewitness expert testimony. In his study, some mock jurors received jury instructions which informed jurors about factors they should consider in
assessing the accuracy of the identification, while some mock jurors
received no instructions."o' Mock jurors with the instructions were
more likely to convict, especially when informed about the witness's
high confidence in his identification. 1 0 2 Thus, the author concluded
that the supposedly informative jury instructions actually perpetuated
problems with assessing eyewitness testimony, and jury instructions
alone cannot combat incorrect information. Future legal actors
should not assume that jury instructions would fare any better for
earwitness identifications.
This does not mean that instructions hold no place in educating jurors about the factors that can impact the accuracy of earwitness identifications. After hearing the earwitness testimony and an expert, jury
instructions can guide the jurors to consider the factors impacting accuracy. This must be done carefully. The instructions should not reenforce incorrect assumptions about the relationship between earwitness confidence and accuracy. Instead, the instructions should re-enforce the expert's testimony to show that the witness's testimony is
not, as some judges state, "an acceptable means for establishing a
speaker's identity." 0 3

100. United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Grace, 526 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
101. Michael H. Hoffheimer, Effect of ParticularizedInstructions on Evaluation of
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 13 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1989).
102. Id. at 54.
103. United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1208 (7th Cir. 1997).
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CONCLUSION

Research consistently finds that factors can impact the accuracy of
eyewitness identifications and much of this research is directly applicable to earwitness identifications as well. This disconfirms the decisions of some courts which refuse testimony on earwitness
identification because there is "no extensive scientific basis that
earwitness' identification is as susceptible to" misidentification. 104 If
judges are ignorant regarding earwitness testimony, how can one expect lay jurors to be keen to the expanding programs of research
about factors that impact earwitness identification accuracy?
Through Frye and Daubert,the courts have specific formulas to assess the admissibility of expert testimony. By looking at sound methodology investigating how misidentifications can occur, experts should
meet the Daubert standard. Earwitness expert testimony will not only
aid the trier of fact to meet FRE 702, but also clear up misconceptions
and not cause undue confusion. Just as the court in U.S. v. Lewis
found that not all of the eyewitness research went beyond the ken of
the jury and met the standards for legal admissibility, not all earwitness testimony will be admissible. This is why the judge retains discretion to withhold unnecessary testimony.105 Furthermore, crossexamination and jury instructions will not be adequate safeguards or a
substitute for expert testimony. While some courts do not permit
earwitness testimony, an intensive analysis should find that earwitness
testimony meets all of the legal admissibility requirements under
Daubertand the Federal Rules. Allowing jurors to hear sound, empirical research that goes beyond common sense and provides sufficient
clarity should help prevent over-reliance on factors such as witness
confidence and reduce the likelihood of earwitness misidentifications.
Eyewitness misidentifications are pervasive in the news because of admirable groups such as The Innocence Project.106 While earwitness
misidentifications do not have the same prevalence either in the media or in the judicial system, it is still important to use empirically
sound research to reduce the chance of biases which could send innocent people to jail.
104. See, e.g., State v. Burnison, 795 P.2d 32, 40 (Kan. 1990).
105. See David L. Faigman et al., The Judicial Response to Proffered Expert Testimony on Talker Identification, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 190 (West Group 1997); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 142 n.171 (2000); Solan & Tiersma, supra note 2, at 432.
106. The Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php.
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